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CANADIAN ABORTION
LAW
RAYMOND MICHAEL FERRI* AND TERESE FERRI**

INTRODUCTION

Rarely has an issue sustained the level of public controversy that the
abortion issue has. Even more rarely has a controversy been as protracted
and seemingly irreconcilable as this. Moreover, the controversy appears to
be heightening rather than diminishing in public stature.
Abortion is surely an issue of the utmost importance in its own right.
But its social impact has been intensified by the fact that it has become a
focal point for many other serious social issues. Abortion has become, it
seems, the point around which two fundamentally irreconcilable sets of
values have begun to crystallize in modern society. Few subjects have provoked such fundamentally divergent responses. As the emerging rift deepens, the ability to remain neutral dissolves.
The implications of abortion in the nature and control of incipient
human life, the function of law, the purpose of medicine, the legal and
ethical responsibilities of public institutions, touch all of us deeply and
personally. These far-reaching implications require that the difficult realities of abortion be honestly confronted and compassionately assessed
with an acute awareness of the individual and social consequences. This
article is an attempt to present and investigate many of the medical, legal
and moral issues at play in the abortion debate.'
* Psychiatric Resident, University of Ottawa; B. S., University of Guelph, Ontario; M.D.,

Queens University, Ontario 1981.
** B.A., University of Waterloo, Ontario, 1976; L.L. B., Queens University, Ontario, 1985.
This article will address itself specifically to the complex problems which the Kingston
General Hospital Task Force on Abortion, Kingston, Canada, has been organized to investigate and report on.
The most recent abortion statistics available from Kingston General are those of 1983.
In that year, the therapeutic abortion committee received 704 applications for abortions. Of
those, 694 were approved and the remaining 10, initially refused, were resubmitted and approved at a later date. Thus all applications received were ultimately approved. Of those,
675 abortions were actually performed (15 women changed their minds prior to the procedure, 7 aborted at home, 4 were not pregnant, 3 were cancelled as too large and 4 were held
over to 1984). Of the 704 abortions approved, 694 were approved on the basis that the
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This article will consider hospital practices as well as decision-making of therapeutic abortion committees in order to evaluate: 1) the legality of present abortion policies and practices at Canadian hospitals and,
2) the therapeutic value of abortion. It will be demonstrated that Canadian law governing abortion is actually often misapplied due to misinterpretation or willful disregard of the legal criteria. Moreover, it will be further demonstrated that the vast majority of abortions performed are nontherapeutic, that they do not enhance maternal health, and in fact pose
serious physical and psychological dangers to the mother that are for the
most part ignored. Present Canadian abortion practices have elicited radical, yet almost imperceptible changes in the ethical principles underlying
the practice of medicine. Most importantly, abortion is the destruction of
human lives, a fact which cannot be disputed in the face of modern
fetology.
THE PRESENT LAW

The present Canadian abortion law is embodied in section 251 of the
Criminal Code.2 It makes the intentional procurement of the miscarriage
of a woman an indictable offense which carries a maximum sentence of
life imprisonment (§ 251(1)). This provision was amended in 1969 to add
an exception to the otherwise general prohibition against abortion in §
251(4). This exception allows qualified medical practitioners to terminate
a pregnancy in an accredited hospital without criminal liability if, prior to
the commencement of the procedure, a majority of the therapeutic abortion committee of that hospital has certified that the "continuation of the
pregnancy of such female person would or would be likely to endanger
her life or health . . . . , A copy of the committee's certified opinion
must be received by the medical practitioner before he may terminate the
pregnancy.
A major impetus in the introduction of this less restrictive law was
the argument that pre-1969 abortion law was unclear as to the criminal
liability of physicians who intentionally caused the miscarriage of women
whose lives were imperiled by pregnancy.4 In the past, it was recognized
mental health of the mother was endangered by the pregnancy.
' CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34 § 251(1) (1970). See generally Somerville, Reflection on Canadian Abortion Law: Evacuationand Destruction - Two separate Issues, 31 U. TORONTO L.J.
1, 7-10 (1981) (analysis of present Canadian Abortion Law ]251).
' CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-34 § 251 (4)(c) (1970).

' See, e.g., Smith and Wineberg, A Survey of Therapeutic Abortion Committees, 12 CRIM.
L.Q. 279, 280-81(1969) (confusion on defenses to crime of abortion). The commentator delineated the uncertainty created by excusing the killing of an unborn child when such is necessary to preserve the life of the mother as stated in § 209(2). Id. at 281. Yet, § 237, which
deals specifically with the procuring of a miscarriage offered no exception to the general
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that at times, the death of an unborn child was an indirect and unavoidable consequence of rendering life-saving treatment to the mother. Section
209(2) of the Criminal Code formerly exempted from liability and the
sanction of life imprisonment "a person who, by means that, in good
faith, [which] he considers necessary to preserve the life of the mother of
a child that has not become a [legal] human being, (i.e. has not yet proceeded in a living state from its mother) causes the death of the child."'
Modern interpretations of the pre-1969 section 209 suggested that it
was not intended to deal with the subject of abortion and that it instead
envisioned "the performance of some mutilating procedure upon a viable
child when the mother's life [was immediately imperiled] .'" Though this
interpretation does not appear to be mandated by the language of the
statute, it was argued that the physicians' liability was unclear in the case
where he or she, for example, removed an ectopic pregnancy, performed a
hysterectomy on a cancerous pregnant uterus or inadvertently caused
death to the fetus by the administration of medications essential to save
the mother's life. The criminal liability of a physician who induced premature labor resulting in still birth to save the life of the mother was
7
equally unclear under prior law.
The purpose of the amendment was, according to Justice Minister
Turner, to resolve these lingering doubts.8 "The fact is the present legislation is not clear and one of the overriding purposes of the legislation is
to clarify it." Later, Justice Minister Turner pressed his view that "the
substance of these amendments does no more than recognize what has
already been happening in a number of hospitals with respect to therapeutic abortions."' Turner stated flatly, "[t]he Bill has rejected eugenic,
sociological or criminal offense reasons .

.

. abortion is to be performed

only where the health or life of the mother is in danger. [The bill] does
not authorize the taking of fetal life; it does not promote abortion.""
Parliamentary debates over the bill provide the context in which the
criminality of the offense. Id.
CAN. REV. STAT.

ch. C-51 § 209(2) (1953-54).

Cf. Boroski v. Attorney General of Canada, [19841 1 W.W.R. 15, 17-22 (historical development of Canadian Abortion Law).
Campbell, Abortion Law in Canada:A Need for Reform, 42 SASK. L. REV. 221, 230 (1977)
(quoting Lederman and Parker, Therapeutic Abortion and the CanadianCriminal Code, 6
CRIM. L. Q. 36, 43 (1963)).
' Cf. Harris and Tupper, A Study of Therapeutic Abortion Committees in British Columbia, 11 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 81, 88 (1977) (purpose of reform of abortion law partly to
uncloud physicians' precarious legal position pre-§ 251).
9 See Campbell, supra note 7, at 230.
1o Id.
" Id. See also A. DEVALK, MORALITY AND LAW IN CANADIAN POLITICs: THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 105 (1974) (discussing abortion law).
0
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originally declared intent of the legislature is manifest. Sociological, eugenic and sexual offense reasons were explicitly rejected as grounds for
terminating a pregnancy. Termination was to be permitted only where
continued pregnancy "would or would be likely to endanger the life or
health" of the mother. Despite numerous recommendations to the contrary, the Minister of Justice refused to define the term "health" as it was
used in the legislation, apparently for fear that this would infringe upon
good medical judgment. "Health," Turner remarked, "is incapable of definition and this will be left to the good professional judgement of medical
practitioners to decide.""5 He was not as reluctant to interpret the meaning of the word "endanger." That term, he concluded, "imports or connotes the element of hazard, peril or risk. . . .The meaning of the word
'endanger' is every bit as clear and significant as the meaning of the
words seriously and directly impair.""
One is able to develop from the wording of the amendment and the
discussion surrounding its introduction, a fairly precise concept of the legal criteria the legislature envisioned. Criminal liability would be avoided
only when it was certified by the therapeutic abortion committee that the
continuation of the pregnancy would (or would likely) seriously and directly impair the life or health of the mother. Therefore, regardless of the
definition given the word "health," the termination must be demonstra1
bly therapeutic. 4
LEGAL AND MEDICAL CRITERIA FOR ABORTION

As already noted, the concept of "health" in present criminal code
provisions governing abortion has proven to be a particularly elusive one.
The Badgley Report 5 on the Operation of the Abortion Law revealed
that a very broad interpretation had been adopted by a majority of physicians as grounds for abortion. Ninety three of the physicians surveyed
endorsed physical health reasons as justifying abortion. Approximately
three-quarters of the physicians surveyed approved of "mental health,"
"eugenic health" and "ethical health" reasons as grounds for abortion.
Fifty-five percent of the physicians surveyed believed that "social health"
ought to be considered when determining whether a pregnancy endangered the health of the mother.
The number of "therapeutic" abortions performed in Canadian hospitals has risen from 11,200 in 1970, approximately three abortions per
" See Campbell, supra 7, at 226 (quoting Hansard, May 6, 1969, at 8124).
" Id. at 225 (quoting Hansard, May 6, 1969, at 8397).
1 Cf. Morgentaler v. The Queen, 53 D.L.R. 3d. 161, 207-08 (1975)(Canadian high court's
construction of § 251 precludes all defenses save § 251(4)).
" R. BADGLEY, P. FORTIER-CARON & M. POWELL, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE ABORTION LAW (1977).
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every 100 live births, to 66,319 in 1982, approximately eighteen abortions
per 100 live births. It is apparent that the interpretation given the concept "health" has continued to expand to accomodate increasing demands
for abortion. The vast number of abortions are approved for non-physical
reasons, as indicated by the "psychiatric," "mental health" and "psychosocial" grounds which formed the basis of approval in 694 or 98.5 percent
of the 704 applications received at Kingston General Hospital, Kingston,
Canada in 1983.
The Badgley Report noted that "most hospitals endorse a broad definition of health, often acknowledging the Charter of the World Health
Organization as the basis for their general treatment activities." These
hospitals consider "the complete physical, mental and social well-being,
not simply the absence of illness or disease." Such a broad interpretation
is patently inconsistent with the manifest intention of the Criminal Code.
The government of Canada, several provincial governments and the Canadian Medical Association have never formally endorsed the World
Health Organization's concept of health. Moreover, determination of the
necessity of an abortion is to be made, according to section 251(4) of the
Criminal Code, by a "therapeutic abortion committee." This committee is
defined in section 251(6) as consisting of at least three members "each of
whom is a qualified medical practitioner, appointed by the board of that
hospital for the purposes of considering and determining questions relating to terminations of pregnancy within the hospital."
That the legislature would entrust this decision-making to physicians
alone manifests its intention to allow the determination to be made on
the basis of medical expertise. 6 Health, in the very broad sense of total
well-being, however, is not exclusively a medical concern. Certainly "[t]he
solution of the multidimensional health problem that is abortion is not
bounded by the compass of [a physician's] competence. . .An examination of the suggested grounds for liberalization of abortion, the medical,
psychiatric, eugenic, juridical and socioeconomic, reveals a crisis which
transcends any one profession. 1 7 The only interpretation of health
within section 251(4) which is compatible with the intentions of the legislature is that the threat to the mother's life or health be assessed within
the important but limited ambit of the physician's specialization, usually
formulated in terms of physical and mental disease and defect.
Regardless of the interpretation given the word "health," under current law, termination of a pregnancy is only permitted where the mother's
" See Harris & Tupper supra note 8, at 89-103 (general discussion on requirements, composition and procedure involved in therapeutic abortion committees).
11D. GRANFIELD, THE ABORTION DECISION 100 (1969). Grarfield further elaborated on the
liberal justification for abortion: medical, psychiatric, eugenic, juridical and socio-economic.
Id. at 100-121.
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life or health is, at least on the balance of probabilities, endangered by
continuation of the pregnancy. There need be demonstrable evidence: 1)
that the continuation of the pregnancy itself poses a substantial risk of
harm to the mother and 2) that the termination of the pregnancy will
eliminate or at least substantially reduce that risk.
Risks to the life or physical health of the mother represent a very
small proportion of therapeutic abortions performed in canadian hospitals.'8 Granfield, in The Abortion Decision, noted:
To justify abortion on medical grounds, the doctor must answer one of two
questions. The traditional question is simply: Is this woman in danger of
dying if she does not have an abortion? The liberal question is: Will the
continuance of this pregnancy seriously impair the physical health of the
mother? These are medical questions, sometimes difficult to determine but
certainly within the competence of the medical profession.'
Answering either question typically leads to a variety of conclusions.
Surveys of randomly selected hospitals in the United States revealed a
wide variation in the proportion of abortions performed for physical
health reasons.20 As early as 1951, Dr. R.J. Heffernan of Tufts Medical
School stated to the Congress of the American College of Surgeons: "Anyone who performs a therapeutic abortion [i.e., an abortion for the sake of
the mother's life or health] is either ignorant of modern methods of treating the complications of pregnancy or is unwilling to take the time to use
them.""1
Dr. Henry Morgentaler has also recognized that physical indications
are of diminishing concern.
Medicine has over the last few years, made so much progress that it is now
possible for a very sick woman to complete a pregnancy and give birth in
spite of serious illness. Thus we see children being born of cardiac and diabetic patients, of women with chronic nephritis, liver disease, hypertension,
and so on. 22
Nevertheless, Dr. Morgantaler goes on to advise women with such
problems to terminate their pregnancies which can only lead one to the
conclusion that he fits within Dr. Heffernan's second category. 3
"' Id. The small proportion of therapeutic abortions performed in canadian hospitals to
minimize actual risks to the life or physical health of the mother is reflected in Kingston
General Hospital's 1983 statistics. Only 7 out of 704 applications (1%) were approved for
"medical complications".
19 Id.

" G. GRISEZ,
I

ABORTION: THE MYTH, THE REALITIES, AND THE ARGUMENTS

74 (1970).

See D. GRANFIELD, supra note 17, at 101 (quoting Quay, Justified Abortion - Medical and

Legal Foundation, 49 GEo. L. J. 173, 184 (1960)).
Is H. MORGENTALER, ABORTION AND CONTRACEPTION 41 (1982).
" Cf. Morgentaler's Crusade Moves East, McLean's, June 27, 1983, at 44 (abortion contro-
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Managing the high risk pregnancy no doubt presents many problems
to the attendant physician. However, even where the risks are substantial,
it is by no means clear that abortion is a therapeutic alternative to delivery. Most conditions that pose risks to the mother during pregnancy present only slight danger in the early stages, which increases only as the
pregnancy progresses. Usually, it is in the third trimester that significant
problems arise. Ideally, management of these pregnancies would enable
them to be carried on as long as the woman is not in actual danger, which
would in most cases bring the fetus to the point of viability. If premature
delivery is threatened due to the deteriorating condition of the mother,
such should be (and is) carried out in the best interests of both mother
and child.
Severe renal disease is an example of the rather rare situation in
which a condition which is exacerbated during pregnancy poses a serious
threat in early pregnancy. Nevertheless, close examination of the available data demonstrates that, even in this tragic situation, the alternative of
abortion is non-therapeutic. In a 1976 study reported in the New England Journal of Medicine, Jewett described the severe risk posed by
abortion (particularly saline abortions) in these cases.2 4 Dr. Richard Watson, in his article "Urologic Complications of Legal Abortions," states:
It is true that more serious threats of crisis exist at term and in the postpartum period, but experience indicates that induced abortion is even more
dangerous for the patient with lupus (nephritis), regardless of the method
used or the stage of gestation. It is probably safer to treat the patient with
increasingly large doses of steroids and attempt to deliver a living child
than to induce abortion. If the nephritis does progress, it is likely that the
fetus will die and abort spontaneously-perhaps the least traumatic
course.2 5
There is a far more common condition in which termination of the
pregnancy is essential to save the life of the mother. This is the case of
ectopic pregnancy. This procedure, which entails the removal of the tube
and most frequently the removal of a live embryo is universally recognized as medically and morally proper. Interestingly, the procedure is virtually never brought to the attention of an abortion committee, not only
versy and Dr. Morgentaler). Over the past decade, Dr. Henry Morgentaler has been at the
forefront of the Canadian abortion controversy. Id. His pro-choice stance, effectuated
through his many abortion clinics, has roused the ire of his equally zealous pro-life opponents. Id. Dr. Morgentaler's ardent views have placed him in the midst of significant abortion litigation in Canada. See, e.g., Morgentaler v. The Queen, 53 D.L.R. 3d. 161, 161 (1975)
(Dr. Morgentaler, defendant, in Canadian Supreme Court case concerning crime of
abortion).
" Jewett, 294 NEW ENG. J. MED. 47 (1976).
" Watson, Urologic Complications of Legal Abortions, IN NEW PERSPECTIVE ON HUMAN
ABORTION 141 (T. Hilger ed. 1981).
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because of the emergent nature of the condition, but because its acknowledged purpose, to save the life of the mother, only incidentally results in
the death of the embryo.
There are other examples of procedures performed to preserve the
mother from serious risks but which have the indirect result of causing
death to the fetus. Hysterectomies performed to remove a cancerous
uterus or a hemorrhaging uterus are cases in which such intervention is
necessary. Again, such procedures rarely obtain permission from therapeutic abortion committees. Their moral and medical validity arises from
the fact that the intention is not to destroy the fetus, and indeed, nothing
in the procedure involves a direct attack on the life of the unborn child as
is the case with saline amniocentesis, D&C and suction curettage.
It is evident that there are medically therapeutic and morally valid
grounds for terminating a pregnancy. But these cases are not represented
in the statistics regarding the therapeutic abortions performed in Canadian hospitals. The figures reflecting abortions performed for "medical
complications" pertain to cases which are far more disputable. The available data suggests that there are very few situations in which the fetus
cannot be brought to the point of possible viability before a pregnancy
must be terminated by premature delivery. Even in those rare instances
when this is not possible, the medical evidence suggests that abortion is
more dangerous than aggressive treatment of the mother and letting nature take its course with respect to the pregnancy.
PSYCHIATRIC INDICATIONS FOR ABORTION

In 1983, at Kingston General Hospital, Kingston, Canada, 694 (or
98.5%) out of 704 abortion applications were approved on the basis of
"psychiatric," "mental health" and "psychosocial" indications. The distinction between these categories is not self-evident since mental health
simply means "health of the mind," while psychiatry is defined as "medical treatment of the mind. '26 Presumably, the distinction is based on the
severity of the condition: "psychiatric" being restricted to disorders associated with physical conditions, psychoses, and long term neuroses while
the "mental health/psychosocial" category covers anxiety, reactive depression, socioeconomic and other factors.
Regardless of the category, the legal requirements for termination of
pregnancy are the same: the therapeutic abortion committee must certify
that the life or health of the mother is (or likely to be) endangered by
continuation of the pregnancy. This requires that the committee have demonstrable evidence that (1) the continuation of the pregnancy itself
poses a substantial risk of harm to the mother, and (2) that termination
6
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of the pregnancy will eliminate or at least substantially reduce that risk.
The demands of medical ethics are no less rigorous than those of the
law. Any medical intervention must be systematically evaluated to determine its safety, its possible side effects and its test validity. In other
words, like the legal requirements, it is only justifiable if it is a verifiable
remedy which significantly improves the health of a patient otherwise
endangered.
The therapeutic value of abortions performed for "mental health"
reasons of varying severity would, like all other grounds, require evidence
that the abortion would relieve a danger to the life or health of the
mother posed by the pregnancy. "Psychiatric" reasons accounted for 20
(or 2.8%) of the 704 applications approved for abortion at Kingston General in 1983. This group included both chronic (18) and acute (2) cases
and presumably represents those most seriously affected by mental health
problems in conjunction with or due to their pregnancies.
Upon investigation of the available data, one is immediately struck
by the lack of methodologically sound studies and substantiation for
clinical diagnoses and prognoses. Little data exists to compare the consequences of abortion with non-intervention alternatives to abortion in
mental health cases. The validity of much research is questionable due to
serious problems, such as small sample size, shortness of study periods,
poor or non-existent follow-up and lack of control groups. The bias of
those conducting the research has also been the subject of frequent comment and criticism. Often the researchers are those referring for and performing abortions. It has been suggested that they therefore have a
vested professional and ethical interest in results which validate their
previous decisions.
The inadequacy of these studies is compounded by the fact that their
conclusions are inconsistent and often diametrically opposed. The
Badgley Report and other investigations reflect a profound lack of consensus within the medical profession on the issue of mental health reasons for abortion. This in itself gives reason for pause since one would
expect that a procedure involving such serious legal and ethical implications would only be undertaken where the evidence of its therapeutic
value was reasonably well-established. Such is not the case.
Despite the inadequacies and inconsistencies of the available data,
there are a number of emerging trends which have particular importance
with respect to claims that abortion is therapeutic for the seriously psy7
chiatrically ill.2
See generally D. GRANFIELD, supra note 17, at 106-07 (objection to abortion as therapeutic to psychiatrically ill). Granfield listed 3 general objections to the therapeutic value of
abortion to the psychiatrically ill. Id. He asserted that the standards by which we gauge the
psychological difficulties of pregnancy and abortion are too vague to warrant abortions. Id.
11
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Abortions for psychiatric reasons (as opposed to mental health
grounds) are generally rationalized on the basis that the pregnancy poses
a substantial risk of deterioration in the woman with pre-existing illness.
Alternati'Vely, abortion is recommended where the woman is so distraught
over her pregnancy that she becomes suicidal.
Kaplan, Freedman and Sadock summarized the conclusions of psychiatric literature, stating that there are no neurotic or psychotic conditions for which abortion is beneficial.2 s Moreover, study after study, regardless of the authors' allegiances on the abortion issue, indicate that
the procedure is contraindicated for women with a history or presence of
severe psychiatric illness.
Termination of a pregnancy is frequently posited as a method of
avoiding the risk of postpartum psychosis in the psychiatrically ill
mother. Dr. Sim, Clinical Director of the Forensic Psychiatry Clinic, Victoria, B.C., pointed out that:
[A]s the condition occurs in approximately 1 per 1,000 live births, only a
bold person would predict history of breakdown-whether postpartum or
from other causes-the risk is increased, but these are the very patients who
should not have an abortion, for they are at even greater risk if they do.2
The incidence of post-abortion psychosis has not been established with
any certainty due to methodological problems inherent in the studies conducted. These have been particularly criticized for low sample size and
poor follow-up. The well-known study of Dr. Brewer showed a post-abortion psychosis rate of 0.3 per 1,000, compared with a postpartum psychosis rate of 1.7 per 1,000.80 This conclusion was based, however, on a mere
25% reply to questionnaires sent to area psychiatrists. Many of those who
abstained from answering were reluctant to assist Dr. Brewer, who was
then psychiatrist for the area's largest abortion clinic and who had publicly declared his bias. 1
Other more reliable research indicates a higher incidence of both puerperal and post-abortion psychosis. Jansson's Swedish study reported a
much higher rate of post-abortion psychosis (19.2 per 1,000 abortions)
at 106. He also mentioned the uncertainty in diagnosis and prognosis attendant to abortion.
Id. at 106-07. His third objection concerned the training of the decision maker stating that
the narrow ambit of the physician's training in relation to the pervasive ramification involved in the decision to abort should disqualify the medical practitioner as the sole arbiter.
Id. at 107.
*8Bergrin, The Abortion Paradox, 96 N. Z. MED. 768, 770 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Bergrin].
" Watson, supra note 25.
30 Brewer, Incidence of Post-Abortive Psychosis: A Prospective Study, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 476,
477 (1977).
31 Sim,
Psychological Consequences of Abortion: A Critique, Canadian Advocates for
Human Life Newsletter, Sept. 1984.
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compared to puerperal psychosis (6.8 per 1,000 deliveries).3 Brewer himself notes that, in Jansson's study, a significant proportion of those
aborted had a history of psychiatric disorder. Brewer recognized that
such women are at far greater risk of developing post-abortion psychosis.
In 1979, Sim and Neisser discovered an even more alarming fact. The
prognosis for post-abortion psychosis was far worse than the prognosis for
women with postpartum psychosis. 99.3% of the postpartum group
showed a good response to treatment, with full remission of symptoms
and restoration to the premorbid level of functioning in an acceptable
period of time, without the problem of a relapsing course. Only 50% of
the post-abortion group, however, showed this level of recovery."3
Numerous attempts have been made to identify factors which might
influence adverse effects after an abortion. Time after time, a history of
or concomitant psychiatric illness has been associated with unfavorable
psychiatric sequelae. One such study demonstrates that approximately
10% of women who have abortions for any reason will subsequently suffer
psychiatric illness. Among the several factors they have identified as having predictive value for post-abortion difficulty is previous psychiatric illness. Another study found that the psychiatric condition of women with
psychiatric problems prior to abortion was worsened in the post-abortion
period.3 '
The threat of suicide is another factor which may weigh heavily in
the decision to recommend abortion. The rationale is that a woman seriously distraught over her pregnancy and actively seeking abortion is at
high risk for suicide if the pregnancy is not terminated.
A number of recent studies have compared the emotional impact of
women who procured abortions with that of women who were refused
them.3 5 None of the researchers reported suicides among those who were
12See

D. GRANFIELD, supra note 17 at 104 (citing Jansson, Mental Disorders After Abortion, 41 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA 87, 110 (1965)).
" See Brewer, supra note 30.
See Friedman, Greenspan & Mittleman, The Decision- Making Process and the Outcome of Therapeutic Abortion, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY. 1332 (1974). The Article discussed a
case study of a woman with a history of psychopathology who developed new psychiatric
symptoms post-abortion. Id. at 1334 [hereinafter Friedman].
" See, e.g. Ford, Castelnuovo-Tedesco and Long, Abortion: Is it a Therapeutic Procedure
in Psychiatry? 218 J. A.M.A. 1173, 1176-77 (1971) (severity of psychological distress preabortion indicative of greater likelihood of negative psychological response post-abortion).
The clinical research revealed that abortion could alleviate certain less severe psychological
disturbances, yet further indicates that the therapeutic value of abortion is suspect where
the patient suffered from more serious psychological disorders. Id. at 1177. This revelation
contradicts the traditional approach taken by therapeutic abortion committees, which are
more apt to certify abortions for patients with severe mental disorders under the notion that
the patient's mental condition would be aggravated by the continuation of the pregnancy.
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refused. Two earlier Swedish studies provided additional data. Linberg
investigated 304 women who had been refused abortions. Of the sixty-two
out of the 304 who threatened to commit suicide if their pregnancies were
not terminated, none did."8 Jansson's findings were even more startling.
In his study, three of fifty-seven mothers who procured legal abortions
mothers who were refused aborsubsequently committed suicide. Of 195
37
tions, however, there were no suicides.
The above data is further substantiated by the investigations of coroners which indicate that suicides among pregnant women are rare and
occur with greater frequency among women of childbearing age who are
not pregnant.38 Moreover, the fact that a woman is unmarried and pregnant does not increase the likelihood that she will commit suicide."
Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that abortion is not
only often non-therapeutic, it may be even injurious to some women in
comparison with non-intervention. As Dr. Gluckman, psychiatrist for the
National Women's Hospital in Auckland, noted, "few would dispute with
Sim (1968) that any procedure in medicine designed to avert a situation
should not result in the same or a worse situation."40
It is apparent that abortions performed for psychiatric conditions are
decisively non-therapeutic. Certification of these abortions by therapeutic
abortion committees reveals either a profound ignorance of the scientific
data, or a deliberate disregard of both legal and medical criteria for
intervention.
MENTAL HEALTH AND PSYCHOSOCIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ABORTION

The vast majority of abortions authorized and performed in canadian
hospitals are done for neither psychiatric nor physical reasons. At Kingston General Hospital, Kingston, Canada, 674 (or 95.7%) of the 704 abortion applications approved in 1983 were on the basis of "mental health

and psychosocial" reasons. The speculative and
category has been the subject of much criticism
abortion debate. It has been denounced as being
too liberally construed, as imposing restrictions
38

variable nature of this
from both sides of the
both too narrowly and
on access to abortions

DelCampo, Abortion Denied - Outcome of Mothers and Babies, 130 CAN. MED. A. J. 361

(1984).
"' See D. Granfield, supra note 17, at 104 (citing Lindberg. 45 SVENSKA LAK-TIEN 1381
(1948)).
Id. (citing Jansson, Mental Disorders After Abortion, 41 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA
87, 110 (1965)).
" Id. (citing Guttmacher, The Influence of Fertility Control Upon PsychiatricIllness 115
AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 683 (1959) and Sim, Abortion and the Psychiatrist,2 BRIT. MED. J. 145, 147
(1963)).
40 D. SIM, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 156 (T.Hilger 1981).
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and as responsible for abortion on demand. Since the therapeutic abortion committee at Kingston General did not refuse a single abortion application in 1983, it is appropriate to assume that the notion of "mental
health" is indeed broadly construed at this hospital.
The "mental health/psychosocial" category, as distinct from the
"psychiatric" category, refers to those cases in which pregnancy-termination is authorized because anxiety, reactive depression, socioeconomic and
other factors allegedly pose a serious threat to the mental health of the
mother. As noted above, the law allows the termination of a pregnancy
only when the therapeutic abortion committee has demonstrable evidence
that the continuation of the pregnancy itself poses a substantial risk of
harm to the mother and which termination of the pregnancy will eliminate or at least substantially reduce. Moreover, it is the professional responsibility of committee members as well as recommending and performing physicians to assure themselves that the procedure is safe and
verifiably remedial.
A recent Canadian study sponsored by the Canada Council surveyed
women who had procured "therapeutic" abortions performed in Canadian
hospitals, on why they had an abortion. Sixty-four percent gave "social"
reasons, including financial factors, age, poor relationship with the father
and problems related to having and raising an illegitimate child. Twentynine percent reported "not wanting (another) child" and "psychological
4
health" reasons. '
In a well-published study funded by the Family Planning Division of
Health and Welfare, Canada, entitled "The Abortion Choice: Psychological Determinants and Consequences," women who received therapeutic
abortions in Canadian hospitals were asked by the interviewers: "What is
your main reason for your decision to have an abortion?" The reasons
given were classified into five categories: (1) family size, (2) financial, (3)
physical, (4) psychosocial, and (5) timing. The reasons given were as follows: (1) 211 did not want children at this time, did not want children at
all or said that their family size was complete. (2) 101 said they could not
afford a child or that they did not have the money to move to larger
accomodations. (3) 97 said they were too old or too young to have a child,
that they were afraid the child would be abnormal or that they feared the
pregnancy would pose risks to their health. (4) 69 said they were not married, did not want friends or family to find out about the pregnancy, that
the child was not their partner's, that the partner did not want a child or
that the pregnancy threatened their mental health. (5) 76 said they were
alone and did not want to raise a child, would have to quit school or a job
4 Gluckman, Some Unanticipated Complications of Therapeutic Abortion 74 N. Z. Med.
J. 71, 71 (1971).
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or that it would interfere with their career plans.4 2
The findings of the Family Planning Division stand in sharp contrast
to the declared intentions of Justice Minister Turner who introduced the
present abortion law. The reasons given by women who had abortions
sharply conflict with the intent of the abortion law's sponsors who rejected eugenic, sociological or criminal offenses as justifications for
abortion.3s
The vast majority of justifications do not begin to meet the legal criteria. Such reasons as the size of one's accomodations, already having the
number of children one wanted, not wanting parents or partner to find
out about the pregnancy and interference with career plans, are not matters intended to enter the legal considerations of eligibility for abortions.
In these cases, it is not the continuation of the pregnancy at all that allegedly threatens the mother, but the threat of an unwanted child.
Of 704 abortions performed at Kingston General in 1983, three were
for "obstetrical/fetal" reasons. They represent eugenic reasons (congenital
anomalies) or risks of fetal abnormalities due to other causes. Again,
these reasons are not the legal criteria for abortion under the current legislation since they do not bear on any risk in the pregnancy to the
mother.
Eugenic criteria are often sought to be grounded on the "mental
health" of the mother. The distress experienced by the mother in response to the possibility or likelihood that her baby will be deformed,
retarded or otherwise handicapped is frequently posited as the grounds
for abortion.4 It is evident in such cases that it is not the continuation of
the pregnancy that so distresses the mother, but the fear that the child
will be handicapped.
Still, it is argued there are many cases in which a woman may experience such intense anxiety and depression as a result of an unwanted pregnancy, that it threatens her normal functioning. Such experiences, it has
been suggested, may truly jeopardize the woman's total mental health.
One must not trivialize the intense emotional impact that an unwanted
pregnancy may have. For almost all women, pregnancy, childbirth and
the responsibilities of parenthood exert great physical and emotional
strain. The burden of that strain is magnified considerably when the
pregnancy, for whatever reason, is unwanted.
It is an unfortunate fact that the inequities and pathologies of society
are often responsible for many of the factors which coerce women to seek
J. GREENGLASS, ABORTION: READING AND RESEARCH 82 (P. Sachdev ed. 1981).
See Campbell, supra note 7, at 224-25 (quoting Hansard, May 6, 1969, at 8397) (legislative intent to create restrictive abortion law).
"4See, e.g., Dickens, Eugenic Recognition in Canadian Law 13 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 547,
562-65 (1975) (discussion of eugenic justification for abortion in Canada).
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abortions. Perhaps, if the current inequities in distribution of resources
and opportunity were eliminated, many pressures to seek abortions would
also disappear. In a society which, through its media and entertainment
and in its promotion of contraception, encourages sexual activity among
its young adults there should be a showing of greater support and compassion for women who suffer the consequences of having responded to
its solicitations. The immediate problems remain, however, and their solutions must be sought within the scope of what is ethical, what is legal
and what is medically therapeutic.
The medical criteria for assessing whether termination of pregnancy
is justified where its continuation is exerting a great deal of stress proceeds upon the same course as the legal criteria: Is the abortion therapeutic? Is it a verifiable remedy which significantly improves the health of a
patient otherwise endangered?
As noted earlier, studies in this area are startlingly scant or unreliable due to serious methodological flaws. There is no agreement within the
medical profession with respect to the therapeutic efficacy of abortion in
the treatment or avoidance of mental health and psychosocial problems.
4' 5
The observations of "PsychologicalReaction to Therapeutic Abortions
appear to represent the current state of opinion:
The effect of abortion on the emotional life of the patient aborted is an
unsettled issue. Those favoring the increased availability of abortion insist
that abortion has few psychological ill effects and that far greater emotional
damage results from the unwanted pregnancy which is carried to term. The
opponents of liberalized abortion argue that psychological damage is usual
following abortion and that, no matter how socially disastrous the continuation of pregnancy is, the long-term effect on the mother is substantially less
injurious without abortion. Unfortunately, neither point of view has suffi6
cient reliable data to prove its case.4
The fact that the therapeutic value of abortion has not been established for these purposes militates against its authorization by a committee which, under the law, must be able to demonstrate such an efficacy in
order to justify its exception from the general prohibition against
abortion.
Despite the lack of data in this area, certain findings have important
implications in assessing the therapeutic value of abortion when it is alleged that a mother's mental health is endangered by continued pregnancy. Several studies have compared the outcome of women who were
refused abortions with other women who had babies.47 In a recent article
45 Niswander,

Singer and Singer, Psychological Reaction to Therapeutic Abortion, 114 AM.

J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Niswander].
46 Id. at 29.
47 See

e.g., Binken, Mhango, Cates, Slovis & Freeman, Women Refused Second Trimester
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in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, Dr. Delcampo surveyed
current literature and concluded that, "[it] shows a generally comparable
outcome of pregnancy, delivery and puerperium between women who
were denied abortion and controls: no evidence that a continued unwanted pregnancy will endanger the mother's mental health; good acceptance of the infant, especially if she has the father's support ....
It is generally agreed that some post-abortion depression, including
feelings of self-reproach and guilt, is extremely common and perhaps universal. Dr. Paul MacKenzie of Kingston General Hospital, in a 1975 study
of abortion patients, expressed surprise at the prevalence of these subjective aftereffects which, he advised, "should not be lightly regarded and
should be explained to the woman in advance." 9 There is no similar consensus regarding the prevalence of more profound and intractable symptomatology. Friedman, Greenspan and Mittleman determined that approximately ten percent of women develop severe post-abortion
psychiatric complications."0 Since it is generally the case that severe morbidity represents only a small proportion of significant complications, it
may be assumed that many more women experience psychological
problems which are as yet unstudied. Dr. Gluckman, psychiatrist for the
National Women's Hospital in Auckland, New Zealand, suggests that significant ongoing psychoneurosis occurs in some twenty-five percent of patients following abortion. 1
A study of objective Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
Test Scores data compared a group of abortion patients with matched
maternity patients both before and after abortion and delivery, respectively. Preoperatively, the abortion patients' scores indicated that they
were less "normal" in overall adjustment, anxiety, depression and impulsiveness than the maternity patients. Both groups showed slight "improvement" six months after abortion and delivery, respectively. However, the authors noted that, "[plostoperative tests showed a significant
reduction in stress for the abortion patients but still indicated that this
group was more depressed and generally less adjusted than the control
''5 2
group.
Studies which have attempted to assess the long-term psychological
Abortion: Correlates of Pregnancy Outcome, 145 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 279, 282 (1983)
(comparing pregnancy outcomes of 316 low income women denied abortions to outcomes of
the rest of the hospital's maternity population) [hereinafter Binken].
48 DelCampo, supra note 36, at 362.
" MacKenzie, Before and After Therapeutic Abortion, 111 CAN. MED. A. J. 667, 671 (1974).
'o See Friedman, supra note 34, at 1334. Several factors are suggested as having predictive
value for post-abortion difficulty including severe psychiatric illness, lack of familial support
and coercion by family of physician. Id.
",See Gluckman, supra note 41, at 77.
U'See Niswander, supra note 45, at 32.
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and social well-being of women who have had abortions are notorious for
their very low rates of participation and response. Dr. Adler suggests that
this failure to participate is, in itself ominous. 53 In the first place, it may
invalidate the studies which are conducted on the basis of data contributed only by those who willingly participate. It is precisely those who are
experiencing difficulties with respect to the abortion who will be reluctant
to participate in studies which require them to focus on what may be a
painful reality. Thus, those without easily recognizable sequelae are selected out as the only participants. Secondly is the fact that a very large
proportion of women who abstain from participating in spite of the persistence of the researchers, suggests that there are very large numbers
who experience shame, regret and depression of such significance that it
inhibits their ability to express their feelings on the issue.
Dr. Gluckman of the National Women's Hospital has noted a strong
correlation between certain psychiatric symptomatlogy and abortion.
"Regardless of specific psychiatric diagnosis, psychiatric and neurotic reactions do occur as post-abortal phenomena."' He feels that "postabortal neurosis and psychosomatic disorders are likely more common
than is realized and are often disguised in terms of the presenting
symptomatology."55

Dr. Gluckman has observed a number of symptoms, particularly gynecological symptoms, in women subsequent to therapeutic abortion. The
most prevalent are: frigidity (in each instance the sexual response had
been much more adequate prior to abortion), dyspareunis (painful intercourse which is most often of emotional origin), amenorrhoea (absence of
menstruation which is psychosomatically induced and often associated
with the expressed wish to be pregnant), menometrorrhagia (excessive,
irregular bleeding which is usually emotionally determined), leucorrhoea
(excessive vaginal/cervical secretions which may be associated with postabortion cervicits but have a high correlation with suppressed erotic desire and premenstrual syndrome where none existed prior to abortion),
ill-defined pelvic discomfort and unexplained sterility.
Every physician is aware of the prevalence of the above symptomatology among women. However, its close association with abortion may be
overlooked, according to Dr. Gluckman, because patients unfortunately
prefer to discuss symptoms rather than causes or emotions associated
with symptoms:
" See generally Adler, Sample Attrition in Studies of PsychologicalSequelae of Abortion:
How Great a Problem?, 6 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 240 (1976) (on the possibility of understated negative reactions to abortion due to the correlation between survey participation
and abortion reaction).
Gluckman, supra note 41, at 77.
55 Id. at 78.
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Any patient with ongoing unexpressed resentments, fears, guilts or anxieties, may develop a chameleon syndrome . . . a chronic illness in which
symptoms are treated with no attention to the patient . . . . Induced abor-

tion is common but most doctors know how rarely this is mentioned when
past history is being investigated. Many such patients retain a sense of
shame or embarrassment about the previous abortion. The unmentioned
may also be the unmentionable.5
Although Dr. Gluckman is not sure what connections there are between abortion and subsequent psychological disturbances, he points out
that "it is not rare for such women to be firm in their view that such
gynecological symptoms were minimal or absent prior to abortion . . .
5
[and that they] were the indirect result of it."'
The clinical experiences of Dr. Gluckman and his perceptions of the
association between abortion and psychiatric and neurotic symptomatology appear to be documented in the Badgley Report, which studied the
use of hospital and physician's services by abortion versus non-abortion
patients.
In a Saskatchewan investigation which reviewed before-and-after use
of health care services by women who had deliveries, spontaneous abortions, therapeutic abortions and sterilizations for 1970 and 1971, statistics
demonstrated that, in the year following their operation, woman who had
therapeutic abortions were diagnosed by their physicians 40.8% more
often as having mental disorders and were treated 25.0% more often for
accidents of conditions resulting from violence than women who had deliveries. Interestingly, the women who had therapeutic abortions, spontaneous abortions and sterilization all subsequently consulted physicians
twice as often for mental-health related reasons as women who had term
58
deliveries.
A five year study in Alberta compared the use made of health services by a group of one hundred women who had therapeutic abortions, to
a group matched who had not. The hospitalization experiences of the
groups differed in significant ways. Sixty-four percent of the abortion patients were subsequently hospitalized as compared to fifty-two percent of
the control group. Seven of the abortion patients versus two of the control group had gynecological problems. The incidence of intermenstrual
bleeding was more than twice as high among abortion patients. Thirteen
percent of the group who had abortions were subsequently hospitalized
with psychological problems (four of which involved an overdose of drugs)
" Id. at 77. See also Richardson & Dickson, Effects of Legal Termination on Subsequent
Pregnancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1303, 1304 (several patients undergoing abortions requested that

their general practitioners not be informed).
" Gluckman, supra note 41, at 77.
" See Badgley, supra note 15, at 319.
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while only four percent of the control group were subsequently hospitalized for psychological reasons (one of whom was an alcoholic).5 9
The Alberta study also compared the two groups for their use of the
services of physicians over the same five year period. Women who had
abortions saw physicians over the same five year period. Women who had
abortions saw physicians with much greater frequency than the control
group (29% and 72 follow-up visits versus 13% and 47 follow-up visits,
respectively). The abortion group also made more subsequent visits to
psychiatrists (25%) than the controls (3%).6o
Despite all of the foregoing data, there have been studies which still
report that a good percentage of women who had abortions show little
immediate guilt or remorse and no long-term psychological sequelae.
These studies assert that these women frequently respond to termination
of the pregnancy with a significant reduction in anxiety and report a general sense of relief and well-being. These reactions are often cited as evidence that the procedure is harmless and genuinely therapeutic. However,
a closer examination of this data provides insight into the psychological
dynamics which are at play and reveals that these allegedly healthy responses are in fact indicative of serious emotional/psychological disorders.
Two studies have investigated the effects of abortion on the basis of
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test scores. 6'
Each reported a post-operative "improvement" in abortion patients but,
as already noted, a similar, if less significant improvement was experienced by the maternity control group post-delivery. Although these studies are frequently cited as evidence of the therapeutic effect of abortion,
they disclose other remarkable findings which assist in explaining the apparently unaffected responses of some women to abortion.
The MMPI scores of both studies indicated that, as a group, the
abortion patients had specific deviations which reflect a classic pattern of
narcissistic and psychopathic personalities. Preoperatively, they had abnormally high scores for hysteria, depression, hypochondria, psychopathic
deviance, psychasthenia and schizoid tendencies. Post-operatively, most
of these scores came down in the high-normal range, but the depression
and psychopathic deviance score remained on the borderline of deviance. 62 Thus, the abortion group appeared to contain a much higher proportion of narcissistic and psychopathic personality disorders than the female population at large. These test scores accurately reflected the
"' See id. at 320.
40 Id.

" See generally Ford, supra note 35 (comparing women's pre-abortion MMPI scores to
their post-abortion test scores); Niswander, supra note 45 (comparing MMPI test scores of
65 abortion patients to 20 maternity patients' scores).
" See Ford, supra note 35, at 1176 (graph comparing deviations before and after abortion).
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maladaptive defenses of the narcissistic and psychopathic personalities
which responded to the stress of the unwanted pregnancy as reflected in
the very high scores. When the source of anxiety diminished, so did their
display of maladaptive behavior.
The characteristics of the narcissistic and psychopathic personalities
described by the Harvard Guide to Modern Psychiatry correspond to the
high scores on the MMPI. These individuals have a low tolerance for anxiety, and show poor impulse control (an inability to delay gratification)
both in the degree of tolerable delay and in the amount of organization
and flexibility available in the pursuit of goals. They exhibit defects in
self-management and in self-esteem as well. "Patients with narcissistic
character disorders have come into increasing prominence recently . ..
The patient is often free of conspicuous symptoms, and the problem may
not be identified without rather extensive familiarity with the patient's
history and pattern of living . . .Nevertheless there are signs of serious
inadequacy in ego development."s
The authors note that "[p]atients with narcissistic
character disorders are likely to be successful and to appear normal when their work,
personal relations and activities are superficially examined." 6 This may
explain why, as a group, women who seek and obtain abortions have
higher income and more education than women who do not seek abortions. The real pathology of the narcissistic and related psychopathic personality is evidenced in the manner in which they govern relationships
with others and the way in which they deal with situations of stress.
As already observed, the narcissistic personality has a low tolerance
for anxiety, but this condition is often not obvious. She may, in fact, behave with:
[U]nusual equanimity .. .because she has developed, in response to the
anxiety, ideas of omnipotence, of invulnerability, of special persecution or
withdrawal, and, often, of dismissal of the anxiety-provoking person or situation .... Self-esteem is maintained only precariously. If successes seem
to dissolve into vanity, closeness into threat, and if others are always seen as
trying unpredicatably to 'escape,' the usual social reinforcements of self-esteem are no longer
effective, and isolation or denial of much experience be65
comes necessary.
Similarly, the psychopathic personalities may respond to her own antisocial acts by displacing blame and denying wrongdoing or guilt. "[S]he
may experience intense feelings of guilt, but that emotion is fleeting and
" Stanton, Personality Disorders, THE
Nicholi ed. 1978).
64

Id.

65Id.

HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY

288 (A.
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soon repaired without basic alterations in behavior.""6
Thus these personalities characteristically employ denial, fantasies of
omnipotence and the assumption of unquestioned entitlement as maladaptive mechanisms to protect a precarious self-esteem, self continuity
and self cohesiveness. Their responses to both the unwanted pregnancy
and to the abortion incorporate these defenses, providing the illusion of a
conflict-free decision and sequelae. Ironically, what has been held out by
some investigators as evidence of the therapeutic value of these abortions,
is, in reality, a classic manifestation of serious psychopathology. The
abortion not only permits but perpetuates the self-deception. The ultimate ineffectiveness of these defenses is only hinted at in the persistently
high depression scores on the MMPI.
Once again, Dr. Gluckman's clinical experience at National Women's
Hospital provides some verification of these psychodynamics. He has
found that psychopathic personalities (including narcissists) who have
had abortions, like congenital mental defectives, "rarely suffer long-term
[psychoneurotic) sequelae of abortion. The ability to evaluate realistically
the intellectual, emotional and moral; and some would add spiritual implications is a prerequisite for conflict. Without such conflict, there can be
' 6' 7
no anxiety.
Claims that abortion is therapeutic in the treatment or avoidance of
mental health or psychosocial problems are tenuous. 5g Studies of women
denied abortion have demonstrated that continuation of an initially unwanted pregnancy will not endanger the mental health of the mother.
There is mounting evidence that serious psychoneurotic illness follows
abortion with unanticipated frequency. Also emerging is a pattern of response to abortion which indicates that serious psychopathy is perpetuated by the "treatment." Furthermore, the vast majority of reasons given
by women for "choosing" abortions cannot possibly provide the basis for
a certification that her life or health is endangered. 9 As noted by Dr.
Sim, "[s]uicide is rarer in the pregnant than in the non-pregnant, serious
mental breakdown is virtually unpredictable and does not occur more frequently than one in a thousand live births and carries an excellent
7'
prognosis. 0
at 290.
Gluckman, supra note 41, at 76.
68 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 35, at 1177 (abortion has little, if any, therapeutic effect on
the mental health of women suffering from neuroses of psychoses).
11 See, e.g., DeCelles, Conservatives and Liberals on Prolife Issues, 144 AMERICA 365, 367
(1980) (women choose to abort because they are driven by the uncontrollable).
'0 Sim, Abortion and the Psychiatrist,2 BRIT. MED. J. 1061, 1061 (1963).
66 Id.
07
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THE RISKS AND COMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION

In determining whether a procedure is therapeutic in a particular situation, one must weigh the risks and complications that may accompany
it against its foreseeable benefits. This has proven to be an impossible
task in the case of abortion because the innumerable complications which
accompany abortion cannot be established with any certainty. Indeed,
many long-term sequelae are only now being recognized, studied and documented. It is clear that abortion is not without risk. But the collection of
reliable data, particularly regarding later complications, is fraught with
difficulty.
Many studies which attempt to assess the physical complications of
abortion are rendered unreliable by their flawed methodology. Follow-up
study is often handicapped by the refusal of women undergoing abortions
to participate initially, or later inability to locate these women for subsequent investigation. Assessing the complication rate of those lost to follow-up studies is extremely difficult. As noted by Dr. Gluckman, women
who experience problems after an abortion are very often reluctant to
confide the fact that they had an abortion when their history is being
investigated. Physicians, therefore, may not be able to connect the current problem with the earlier abortion. Even when the physician knows of
the woman's previous abortion, he may not attribute the present problem
to the abortion because of the remoteness of the two events. If the physician treating the current ailment was the one who originally recommended the abortion or in fact performed it, it may be all the more likely
that he will be reluctant to make the association.
Very few studies of complication rates have extended longer than a
year past termination. Most are restricted to the stay in hospital and,
therefore, document only the most immediate effects.7 1 In spite of the
scantness of current data, women are assured that the procedure is safe,
particularly in the early stages of pregnancy. New findings have begun to
question safety, giving the cautious individuals reason to pause on the
issue of the physical after-effects of abortion."
The 1983 statistics of the Kingston General Hospital, Kingston, Canada, indicate that the early complications of abortion carry a morbidity
rate of approximately 3%. This rate is confirmed by a review of 352,000
73
Canadian abortions in the 6 year period of 1975-1980.
The incidence of later complications is far less understood. It has not
71 See Wodhera, Early Complication Risks of Legal Abortions, Canada 73 CAN. J. PUB.

HEALTH 396, 396 (1982).
71 See generally Stallworthy, Moolgaker & Walsh, Legal Abortion: A Critical Assessment
of Its Risks, 2 LANCET 1245 (1971) (the risks of pregnancy termination).
" See id.
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been the subject of serious study until fairly recently. So far, the data
suggests that therapeutic abortion is associated with the following conditions as post-abortion phenomena: infertility or decreased fertility;
preterm delivery; cervical incompetence; urinary stress incontinence and
urinary tract infections. 7 At the present time, studies are conflicting and
often unreliable, which makes assurances of safety in the procedure
uncertain.
ABORTION AND THE UNWANTED CHILD

An increasingly common argument in favor of abortion of unwanted
pregnancies seeks its rationale in considerations of the welfare of the
child. Dr. Morgentaler, Canada's leading abortion advocate, is convinced
that unplanned and unwanted pregnancies contribute to a "wide range of
serious and psychological disturbances in these children" and feels that
abortion is a "highly responsible choice, not only to avoid damage to the
child, but also to safeguard the emotional and physical health of the
76
woman."
In a lecture at Queen's University, Dr. Morgentaler took his argument a step further by suggesting that these unwanted children eventually account for much of the criminal and dangerously psychiatrically-ill
elements of society. The view that abortion offers a solution to the social
burdens and alleged dangers posed bythose as yet unborn, is not new. It
has been the subject of comment by several justices who participated in
the famous, precedent-setting American abortion case, Roe v. Wade.7
They have considered the consequences of state denial of abortion upon
indigents and the state itself, citing the "welfare costs that will burden
the State for the new indigents and their support in the -long, long years
ahead. ' 77 Pro-abortionists assert that "not only is the quality of life of
71

See

71 H.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ABORTION 128-43
MORGENTALER, ABORTION AND CONTRACEPTION 52

(T. Hilgers ed.,1981).

(1982). For some interesting back-

ground on Dr. Morgentaler's pro-abortion crusade, see Morgentaler's Crusade Moves East,
McLEAN'S, June 27, 1983, at 44. See also Morgentaler v. The Queen, 53 D.L.R. 3d. 161
(1975) (Morgentaler's appeal of conviction for performing an illegal abortion dismissed).
76 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court held a Texas criminal statute unconstitutional for proscribing all abortions which were not necessary to preserve the
mother's health without regard to the stage of pregnancy. Id. In another Supreme Court
decision, a Georgia statute was found unconstitutional for requiring hospital accreditation
by a private organization, approval by a hospital abortion committee, and in-state residency
of applicants. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). For a discussion of the Roe and Doe
decisions' impact on Canadian abortion law, see Comment, The Abortion Decision - A Qualified ConstitutionalRight in the United States: Whither Canada?, 51 CAN. B. REY. 643,
654-58 (1973).
17 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a separate dissent,
Justice Marshall argued that an indigent woman who was denied a state funded abortion
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those born worthy of enhancement, but there is also some need for
prebirth termination of the lives of those whose projected quality of life is
low,"78 such as those who, if born, would be "relegated to lives of poverty
and despair."79
One may be skeptical about the genuineness of this self-declared
compassion for the quality of life of the unborn, especially when there
exists such powerful vested interests in rationalizing their destruction.
One may be struck by the inherent paradoxes of a solution which offers to
those it claims to perceive as in danger of being victimized and deprived,
the answer of extermination. 0 Apart from the problem of internal inconsistencies, this social theory is suspect because the "solution" it advocates
depends upon the parents' wish for an abortion to justify termination of
the pregnancy. If the rationale for abortion is the defense of society from
children who may become a danger or financial burden to it, state intervention could conceivably be authorized over parents' protests.8' Like
82
compulsory sterilization laws which still exist in the United States, society could presumably adopt Mr. Justice Holmes argument that it has the
right "to prevent . . our being swamped with incompetence 8 3 and "to
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." '
This language and reasoning is chillingly reminiscent of Nazi Germany's
master-race theory."5 History has demonstrated, with terrifying lucidity,
that such logic never stops with the unborn.
Arguments favoring liberal abortion regulations often rely on the belief that an unwanted child may become a victim of cruelty or suffer more
in terms of mental health than "unwanted" children. This rationale has
received its major impetus from a 1966 Swedish study which compared
the children born to women denied abortions with wanted children. 86 The
would be "forced into full-time child care for years to come; [and] unable to work so that
her family [could] break out of the welfare system or the lowest income brackets." Id. at 458
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
11 Parness, Social Commentary: Values and Legal Personhood,83 W. VA. L. REV. 487,498
(1981).
79 Id. (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
so See, e.g., Krimmel & Foley, Abortion: An Inspection Into the Nature of Human Life and
Potential Consequences of Legalizing Its Destruction, 46 CIN. L. REV. 725, 780-82 (1977)
(eugenic abortion advocates motivated by concern for the parents and the society rather
than the child).
s' Id. at 785.
8 See Parness, supra note 78, at 495 n.37.
8sBuck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
84 Id.
" See Parness, supra note 78, at 498.
" See generally Cameron & Tichenor, The Swedish "ChildrenBorn to Women" Abortion
Study: A Radical Criticism, 39 PSYCHOLOGY REP. 361 (on the detrimental effect of abortion
denial on unwanted children).
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authors concluded that the test group (the children of women denied
abortions) showed significant social and psychological handicaps when
compared to the control group. The study suggested, in particular, that
the test group showed a greater propensity for anti-social and delinquent
behavior than the control group.
The Swedish study is still cited by advocates of abortion despite the
fact that subsequent studies have completely discredited it because of serious methodological flaws. 8 7 Critics of the study have shown that its researchers failed to carefully match the two groups, and as a result that
test group contained a significantly higher proportion of children of lower
socio-economic status. This fact explains the discrepancies in profiles between the two groups since poorer children generally suffer from the lack
of opportunities and advantages afforded the more affluent.88
A more recent study (1971) conducted by Dytrych in Czechoslovakia
attempted to assess the outcome of children of mothers denied abortions
nine years after birth. 8' In this investigation, the test group of 220 children whose mothers were denied abortions was carefully matched to the
control group on the basis of age, grades in school, sex, birth order, number of siblings, mother's marital status and father's occupation. The research did not bear out the discrepancies found in the Swedish study. No
gross maladjustment or maladaption problems were indicated. The study
did suggest, however, that as compared to the control group children, the
test children were acutely ill more often, were more often described as
bad tempered or naughty by their mothers, were felt to be less conscientious and more excitable, did slightly worse in school and were regarded
as having less desirable personality traits by their mothers, teachers and
peers.
Although the Dytrych study made some interesting findings with respect to the children of women denied abortions, the study does not
prove that these children are disadvantaged because they were
unwanted. 9
As previously noted, studies which have investigated the personalities and psychological profiles of women seeking abortion have established that, as a group, these women exhibit a higher proportion of narcissistic and psychopathic personality disorders than that of the general
female population. It was also noted that people with these character disZemlick & Watson, Material Attitudes of Acceptance and Rejection During and After
Pregnancy, 23 A. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 570, 582-83 (1953) (rejection expressed in post-parturn overprotection may handicap a child).
" See Gentles, Abortion and the Unwanted Child, IN DEATH BEFORE BIRTH 119 (E. Kremer
& E. Synan eds. 1974).
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orders have a very low tolerance for anxiety and are impulsive., Such
women are, therefore, more likely to seek abortion for less "critical" reasons. They would, therefore, be the least likely, within the abortion group,
to have for example, medical, eugenic, or other serious grounds for seeking abortion. Thus, these women would also be the most likely to be denied abortion. The women denied abortion in these studies were the likeliest to suffer from narcissistic and psychopathic personality disorders.
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the children of such women
might also have personalities that are susceptible to this particular pathology. It is even less surprising that the mother's pathology would have
a detrimental effect on their children regardless of their original "wantedness." To conduct a valid study of the outcome of "unwanted" children,
one would have to compare the children of women denied abortion with
the planned children of women who had previously been aborted on the
same grounds as those denied. It is suggested that the two groups will not
only be indistinguishable, but that both will share social and psychological deficiencies as compared to a group of children whose mothers never
sought abortions, regardless of whether their pregnancies were "wanted"
initially.
A number of subsequent studies, however, have demonstrated that
the initial response to and acceptance of a pregnancy is not an important
factor determining the outcome of the child.9 2 On the contrary, it has
been indicated by studies that 90% of children who were battered by
their parents were actively planned and "wanted"9' 3 and that there was
more deviant behavior among women who had planned their pregnancies
94
than those who had not.
The arguments in favor of abortion when the pregnancy is unwanted
base their rationale on the defense of society from future "criminals and
mental incompetents" or on considerations of the quality of life of these
children as yet unborn.9 5 Neither survives scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

It is evident that a serious discrepancy exists between the law governing abortion and its actual application in Canadian hospitals. Whether
this is due to misinterpretation or willful disregard of the legal criteria is
a matter of speculation. In either case, therapeutic abortion committee
" Cf. Zemlick & Watson, supra note 87, at 581 (there is a significant increase in accepting
attitudes toward babies after parturition).
" See Campbell, supra note 7, at 249 n.164 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 243 n.165 and accompanying text.
Id. at 243 n.166.
" See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (advocating abortion to prevent the birth
of imbecils and degenerates).
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members ought to be informed about the accumulating evidence which
militates against abortion as a therapeutic procedure.
Hospital boards, charged with the responsibility of appointing therapeutic abortion committee members, are ultimately responsible for abortion practices at their hospitals. They have a duty to insure that the committee members are aware of the legal requirements and criteria and that
these members are not abusing the authority with which they have been
vested by the board. Hospital boards cannot escape legal and ethical responsibility for abortion decisions which make a mockery of the law simply by washing their hands of the issue or maintaining ignorance of the
decision-making process. They are responsible for those they appoint.
They are responsible for formulating hospital policy on abortion and for
insuring that committee members understand the limits of their
authority.
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the vast majority of
pregnancy terminations are medically non-therapeutic. They do not enhance maternal health, but on the contrary, pose serious physical and
psychological risks which are to a large extent ignored. In this respect, the
approach to abortion is a radical departure from traditional medical
practice.
Dr. Delcampo considers this discrepancy:
Few interventions are accepted without systematic evaluation. Drugs shown
to be effective in the laboratory are evaluated in clinical trials, and surgical
procedures are constantly criticized and revised. Even diagnostic tests must
be shown to be safe, to cause only minor side effects and to have adequate
test validity. Therapeutic abortions appear to be a major exception; they
apparently have been privileged to bypass evaluation. Why are they being
done without clinical validation, even in the face of mounting evidence that
they are not necessary for the prevention of maternal disease or the birth of
unwanted children? . . . Physicians must take a more scientific approach to
unwanted pregnancies and realize that abortion is not the answer to social
ills. Legislators should base their decisions on clinical reviews rather than
succumb to public pressures.9
Present abortion practices are eliciting a radical, if almost imperceptible, change in the ethical principles underlying the practice of
medicine and the provision of health care.
The change has not come in the unborn child which still develops the same
way; not in the uterus which contains it. Rather it has come in what doctors
do and why they do it. The change has come in the ethic which now regards
as commendable something which for a doctor was previously forbidden to
practice. And the reason the doctor has changed is not medical but pressure
DelCampo, supra note 36, at 362.
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from the patient community who have changed their standards and requests. To accede to such requests is, I believe, to subordinate surgical
judgement to social dictation. In more ways than one legalized abortion is a
form of tyranny.97
Present abortion practice is making a mockery of the law and a
mockery of medicine."' It is, in itself, symptomatic of a hypocritical and
narcissistic society which seeks its immediate gratification but has neither
the courage nor the psychological stamina to face up to the realities of its
own violent actions. In a manner characteristic of narcissistic denial,
there exists a pervasive conspiracy of silence with regard to the reasons
for, and consequences of abortion, and with regard to unborn victims of
abortion.
The significance of the abortion issue in modern society cannot be
underestimated. It has become the point around which two fundamentally irreconcilable sets of values have begun to crystallize. The division it
represents is perhaps more profound than any other. It implies opposing
views about such fundamental issues as the function of law, the purpose
of medicine and the very nature and value of human life. One view offers
a society caught in the web of its own narcissistic tyranny, which frantically seeks immediate gratification in a futile attempt to sustain its fantasies of omnipotence and invulnerability; fantasies which will ultimately
crumble under the weight of a reality it refuses to face. The other holds
hope for a future society which is compassionate and rational, which protects its most vulnerable and has the fortitude to sacrifice immediate
gratification for the sake of the values and principles that will insure its
long-term survival and betterment. The choice is ours.

Bergrin, supra note 28, at 770.
See D. SIM, supra note 40, at 1062 (abortions are being recommended on psychiatric
grounds, not because they are justified, but to circumvent the law to accommodate those
who don't wish to bear children).

